




SECRET//NOFORN//20300904

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

4 September 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

### JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

#### 1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdul Rahman
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Kamalludin Kasimbekov and Kasinbeg Takhirjovanich Kamaladin
- Place of Birth: Tashkent, Uzbekistan (UZ)
- Date of Birth: 9 November 1977
- Citizenship: Uzbekistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9UZ-000675DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He is treated for mild asthma and seasonal allergies. Detainee had an appendectomy prior to detainment. He is on an as-needed inhaler and decongestant medications. He has no known drug allergies.

#### 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement.

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 11 November 2004.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES  
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300904

SECRET//NOFORN//20300904

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

For this update recommendation, detainee has admitted being a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is associated with what is now termed the Al-Qaida Associated Movement. Detainee admitted connections to some of the highest-level members of the IMU. The Uzbek government requested detainee's return for prosecution. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary:** Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee worked as a clothing/textiles merchant and taxi driver. Detainee claimed he paid a bribe so he would not have to join the military.

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee claimed his friend Abdul Raouf recruited him into the IMU. Upon recruitment, detainee left Uzbekistan and traveled to Khait, Tajikistan (TI) via Yangejaar, UZ, and Shepiski, Oratepi, and Dushanbe, TI. Upon arrival in Khait in August 1999, he attended an unidentified training camp where he trained on the AK-47 and RPGs. A week later, detainee traveled to an unknown area in Kyrgyzstan (KG) where IMU leader Jumaboy Namangani (now deceased) held three Japanese scientists. Detainee remained there for two weeks before heading back to Tajikistan. (Analyst Note: Abdul Raouf is a common alias used within the IMU. In fact, one Abdul Raouf was reportedly killed with Jumaboy Khojiiyev Namangani. Therefore, more information is required to determine the role that detainee's Abdul Raouf played in the IMU.)

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** After an illness, detainee resumed his travels and arrived in Dushanbe. In May 2000, detainee departed Dushanbe for Afghanistan with an automobile and weapons. Detainee traveled to the Wazir Akhbar Khan area of Kabul, AF, via Konduz and Mazar-e-Sharif. Once there, detainee worked in an auto shop doing repairs for 10 months and then approached his boss, Mohammed Tahir Faruq, a known IMU leader, to ask for permission to return to see his family. Detainee decided to leave without permission, but was caught by -Namangani and returned to Mazar-e-Sharif where he was sentenced to 151 days in prison for stealing a car that detainee claimed his co-worker stole. Detainee was released and told to stay in Konduz, AF, by Faruq; however, detainee became bored and decided to travel to the front lines. Detainee remained there for 40 days.

**d. (S//NF) Capture Information:** After 40 days, detainee returned to Konduz where he was arrested by Amir Sheikh on or about 10 November 2001. Reports indicate detainee was

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

carrying a Kalashnikov and four magazines when captured in Konduz by Abdul Mohmim (the Commander in Mulaqoli). Detainee was transferred to Bagram Detention Center and placed in US custody.

**e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO:** 14 June 2002

**f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- The IMU, the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan (IMT), and the activities of these organizations in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Detainee can also provide information about the leadership of these organizations, their logistics, training, and recruitment networks.
- The Tajik government's support for Islamic militant organizations, including the IMU.
- The IMU militant training conducted in the town of Khait in Northern Tajikistan.

**5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:**

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted being a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) since 1999. He has ties with a number of high-level IMU members. (Analyst Note: IMU has been designated a tier 1 target and has been found to have ties to Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and the Al-Qaida terrorist network. Tier 1 terrorist targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee signed a confession in which he admitted being a member of the IMU and admitted receiving training at IMU training camps in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
    - (S//NF) Detainee has been identified in an Uzbekistan Ministry of Internal Affairs "Mugbook" used to identify IMU members.

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

- (S//NF) IMU operatives in custody of a foreign government identified detainee by name as receiving terrorist training in Khait, TI, as being a driver for a hospital in Kabul, AF, and as being detained in GTMO.
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted to seeing three Japanese scientists held hostage by the IMU while in a training camp run by Namangani. Alternate sources confirmed IMU leader Namangani's group captured and held hostage four Japanese engineers, a Kyrgyz general officer, and several members of the general's unit between August and October 1999.
- (S//NF) Detainee's statements concerning how the funds received after ransoming the Japanese and Kyrgyz hostages were spent is suspect. (Analyst Note: This is not something that a low-level fighter would know.)
  - (S) Detainee claimed that the movement of 1,000 Uzbek refugees, including 300 mujahideen, women, and children, was funded by ransom of \$7 million USD received for return of Japanese tourists and a Kyrgyz general.
  - (S//NF) Detainee also claims that he was not paid for his time at the garage, but was instead given clothing, food, and whatever else he needed. Supplies actually came from the ransom for the Japanese hostages.
  - (S//NF) Alternate reporting stated that Namangani negotiated the release of an IMU field commander imprisoned in Kyrgyzstan and an undisclosed ransom payment in exchange for the hostages through IMU political leader, Abdurahim and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leaders.
- (S//NF) Detainee had a close working relationship with IMU leader Tohir Abduhalilovich Yuldashev aka Muhammad Faruq Tahir, and knowledge of other IMU leaders.
  - (S//NF) Detainee claimed that IMU Leader Tohir Abduhalilovich Yuldashev aka Hoksor Jamshid aka Qori Tahir aka Muhammad Faruq Tahir offered him a job as a mechanic in Kabul, AF. Detainee commented that he turned his passport and visa over to Tahir, as did all of the Uzbeks in Kabul. (S//NF) Deceased IMU leader Namangani was in charge of the Khait IMU training camp that detainee attended. Mohammed Akhund Fazl, US9AF-000007DP (ISN 007), identified Namangani as the leader of the foreign fighters and Arabs (Al-Qaida) in Afghanistan. (S//NF) Namangani was an Uzbek national responsible for a number of killings of members of the Uzbek Republic State Power and Administration, as well as a number of other terrorist related activities. (S//NF) IMU Tajik Mujahideen Commander Qasim Jon had a camp in Dushanbe, TI.
  - (S//NF) IMU Highest Rank Tajik Mujahideen Commander Mirza Zai aka Jaka worked for Abdullah Noori according to detainee. Mirza Zai, who was seen in

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

the company of Namangani a number of times, possibly provided assistance to the IMU and arranged for Russian soldiers to provide transport across the Amu Darya River into Afghanistan for detainee and a group of 300-400 other Uzbeks.(S//NF) IMU Commander Abdullah Noori ran an organization that uses the acronym NAGZT. (S//NF) Detainee worked for Dr. Afuzbek, who provided care for IMU leader Jumaboy Namangani and his family, as well as other Uzbeks. (S//NF) The government of Uzbekistan requested detainee be returned to them for prosecution.

- (S//NF) Detainee claimed his friend Abdul Raouf borrowed his car to transport members of the IMU. The IMU passengers killed two policemen when detainee's car was stopped and searched. However, according to other reporting, this incident did not happen on the road, but in a residence during an assault/robbery where the owner of the residence and two policemen were killed in Tashkent, UZ. (Analyst Note: It is highly probable that detainee is wanted for prosecution for his membership in the IMU and the killing of two policemen.)
- (S//NF) As of March 2002, The Kazakhstan Committee for National Security (KNB) believed that detainee might be able to provide information on Abdul (variant Abdukhalim) Pakhrutdinov, a suspected IMU facilitator in Kazakh custody, as well as Hussein Aidinovich Azizov.
  - (S//N) Reporting stated that Pakhrutdinov had a close relationship with IMU leader Namangani, and may have played a role in the 1999 bombing attack in Tashkent, UZ. Pakhrutdinov operated a business exporting flour from Kazakhstan (KZ) to Afghanistan as cover for his wealth, but in reality was involved in the smuggling and sale of narcotics. In addition to narcotics trafficking, Pakhrutdinov was involved in recruiting individuals out of a mosque near Shymkent, KZ, on behalf of Al-Qaida and the IMU. (Analyst Note: It is unknown at this time why the KZ government thinks that detainee is linked to this individual, unless Pakhrutdinov was involved with facilitating detainee's travel. In addition, both Pakhrutdinov and detainee were closely associated with -Namangani. No other reports could be found concerning Hussein Aidinovich Azizov.)
- (S//NF) Detainee claimed that he was imprisoned in Mazar-e-Sharif until approximately 17 September 2001. Other reports indicate the Mazar-e-Sharif facility's primary function was training IMU personnel on basic and advanced infantry tactics, weaponry, grenades, advanced shooting, topography and mine employment. (Analyst Note: This training facility was destroyed in December 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)).

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted that he fought against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, but claimed to have never fired a weapon and only to have transported weapons and ammunition to the fighters involved in the combat.
- (S//NF) Fawz Bin Namen, US9YM-000678DP (ISN 678), remarked that he and two other Uzbeks (Abdul Rahman and Thaker Jan) were captured on the same day, spent a night in a house together, and were then taken to the Mullah Qoli town jail. (Analyst Note: Thaker Jan is assessed as Zakir Jan Hasam, US9UZ-000672DP (ISN 672), and Abdul Rahman is assessed as detainee. Detainee failed to provide any information on these two individuals. ISN 672 is a probable member of the IMU and ISN 678 probably trained at Al-Qaida's terrorist training camp, Al-Farouq, and is an admitted jihadist who personally swore bayat (oath of allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden (UBL).)

**c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a LOW-MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff

## **6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

- (S//NF) Detainee has provided information on the IMU, including such areas as recruitment, indoctrination, training locations, personalities, etc. Detainee should be able to provide additional information in these areas that can be corroborated and/or add more insight to other detainees' reporting. In addition, detainee has failed to provide any information on the two Uzbeks captured with him.

### **b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**


- IMU
  - Recruiters
  - Recruitment Procedures
  - Training Camps
  - Reception Center
  - Assessment Process
  - Personalities

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000675DP (S)

- Mazar-E-Sharif training facility
- Uzbeks captured with detainee (ISN 672 and 678)

**7. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 21 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



JAY W. HOOD  
Major General, USA  
Commanding