VZCZCXRO3220
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0588/01 0661238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071238Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2031
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000588 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE SOUTH AND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 583 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
(U)  This is one in a series of messages intended to provide 
background for policy-makers on Iraq. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) As evidenced by the recent provincial elections, won 
decisively by Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa-led State of Law 
coalition, southern Iraqis have moved from overt Shi'a 
identification to a more nationalist, pragmatic stance. 
Maliki catalyzed and capitalized on this shift by carrying 
out military operations against Sadrist militias in Basra and 
Maysan, and by distancing Da'wa from the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI).  To consolidate gains, Maliki and his 
party still need to show they can deliver services and expand 
oil and industrial production in destitute southern 
provinces, some of which have regionalist aspirations of 
their own.  Nevertheless, the Prime Minister's post-election 
strength and the dramatically improved security in the south 
have created opportunities to reconcile its Sadrist 
combatants and perhaps reunify Shi'a parties at the national 
level.  Religiously moderate, partial to strong central 
leadership, and deeply suspicious of both Iran and the Kurds, 
Maliki and Da'wa more closely reflect southern sentiment than 
other Shi'a religious parties or secular alternatives.  The 
rise of a more moderate and nationalist southern Shi'a 
identity brings benefits, but could make it more difficult 
for Iraqis to address their long-standing internal disputes. 
End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
From Religious to Nationalist Identity 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) As the birthplace of Shi'ism and home of its two 
holiest cities -- Najaf and Karbala -- southern Iraq exerts 
considerable political influence not only on Baghdad, but 
also on Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, and elsewhere.  Saddam Hussein 
brutally suppressed Shi'a activities for this reason, fueling 
the passionate Shi'a identity that emerged after his fall. 
The religious parties associated with Shi'a revival (ISCI, 
Sadrists, Fadhilah) quickly discredited themselves with 
corrupt governance and militia violence.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the Shi'a religious hierarchy, led by 
Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Sistani, never endorsed 
governance by religious parties -- either in 2005 or 2009 -- 
opting instead to encourage maximal Shi'a participation in 
voting.  The approach taken by the religious leadership has 
liberated southerners to endorse more technocratic, 
nationalistic and relatively secular figures, while ensuring 
that the southern Shi'a still maintain the country's dominant 
political position.  Sistani's health is reportedly fragile 
and it is unclear who his successor would be, how long it 
would take to identify him, or whether he would pursue a 
similar approach. 
 
----------------- 
Improved Security 
----------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Nouri al-Maliki, originally chosen as Prime Minister 
because of the weakness of his Da'wa party, dramatically 
improved security in the South and Baghdad by ordering 
operations against Sadrist militants in Spring 2008.  The 
Jaysh al-Mahdi was routed in the process, losing control of 
the Basra ports and key marshland smuggling lanes -- a loss 
of several million dollars per month for them, which has 
never been replaced.  Security has since improved in all 
southern provinces.  In Basra, as U.S. troops prepare to 
assume command from the UK at the end of March, they enter a 
theater in which the Coalition Operating Base -- formerly 
subject to daily attacks -- has not seen a single rocket 
Qsubject to daily attacks -- has not seen a single rocket 
fired at it since last October.  Southern Iraqis are not 
generally aware of the extent of the U.S. assistance that had 
been required, especially in Basra, to enable the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF) to succeed.  Most of our contacts in 
the region know, however, that the ISF have great needs, and 
are less than confident about their ability to stand up to 
Iran when U.S. forces leave. 
 
----------------- 
The Maliki Factor 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The disproportionate suffering under Saddam's regime, 
 
BAGHDAD 00000588  002 OF 003 
 
 
the Iran-Iraq War, and subsequent conflicts have forged a 
southern Iraqi character that is nationalist, disdainful of 
Iran, distrustful of the Kurds and Sunnis (and perhaps the 
U.S.), but pragmatic enough to know it is necessary to work 
with all sides.  We repeatedly hear southern Iraqis, 
including members of other parties, praising Maliki for 
embodying these traits -- especially the anti-Iranian 
component.  This level of respect enabled Maliki's Da'wa-led 
State of Law slate to carry nine of ten Shi'a-majority 
provinces in the elections, losing only Karbala (due to an 
intra-party split which has since healed; Da'wa will remain 
in power in Karbala also).  While his provincial coalition 
list only won decisive pluralities in urban areas such as 
Basra, Nasiriyah, and Diwaniyah, where security improvements 
are most notable, anecdotal and polling evidence suggests 
that most southerners support the Prime Minister at the 
national level.  Maliki has used his political capital back 
home in various ways, most notably by increasing centralized 
control over the ISF and by attempting to carry out 
reconciliation with Sadrist combatants, and possibly even 
form a political alliance with Sadrist parties. 
 
¶5. (C) Over the past year, Maliki has centralized ISF command 
in several southern provinces and made it responsive to his 
office, bypassing normal Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police command 
chains.  He has also made several ISF appointments outside 
the letter of Iraqi law.  While these tendencies are not as 
potentially explosive as in Diyala or the Kurdish region, 
they have provoked resentment by some southerners, especially 
ISCI members, while providing questionable security benefit. 
Maliki's Sadrist overtures, which include an ongoing 
provincial-level review of detainees and the negotiation of 
provincial alliances throughout ths south, are much more 
hopeful.  The reintegration of Sadrists into the governing 
system carries far greater political risks, however, since 
southern Iraqis remember the violence and chaos associated 
with their last, still quite recent, stint in government. 
That the Prime Minister would even attempt such a 
controversial initiative underscores his strengthened 
position in the south and his desire to minimize the standing 
of ISCI. 
 
------------------- 
Delivering Services 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Prime Minister and his State of Law coalition list 
also face challenges in providing infrastructure and basic 
services to provinces in which electricity and water are only 
available to most people a few hours per day.  While the new 
Provincial Councils (PC) appear to have more technocratic 
professionals with relevant skills, every province in the 
south has over 60 percent turnover on the PC, in some cases 
over 80 percent.  Inexperience, combined with declining 
government revenues, make it likely that voters will be 
disappointed with the pace of reform and development.  Much 
of the disappointment will be directed at us -- there is a 
strong feeling in the south that the U.S. has an obligation 
to rebuild Iraq's basic infrastructure.  Our contacts, 
especially at the grassroots level, believe and expect that a 
large portion of the savings from our military wihdrawal must 
be redirected toward civilian assistance, including 
big-ticket initiatives.  They have not realized fully that we 
will soon be leaving. 
 
---------------------------- 
Oil and Regional Aspirations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Declining oil production in the south and the fall in 
the worldwide price of crude oil further limit the ability of 
Qthe worldwide price of crude oil further limit the ability of 
the provincial and national governments to address the 
region's problems.  Oil Ministry officials estimate that 
production from the southern fields will fall from 1.9 to 1.8 
million barrels per day this year.  While the Ministry 
announced in October 2008 that service contracts will be on 
offer for companies to address the underlying problems of 
oil-field degradation and aging facilities, the contracts 
would not come on line until 2010 at the earliest and 
production may continue to decline until 2011.  While falling 
oil revenue has not yet become a politicized issue, 
frustrations could boil over if government services are not 
delivered, especially in oil-rich but economically devastated 
Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar. 
 
¶8. (C) In the oil-rich far southern provinces, which receive 
much less in government revenue than they produce, talks of 
region formation recur occasionally.  The idea lacks support 
among major political parties, however.  The recent failed 
attempt at one-province region formation by the unpopular 
outgoing governor in Basra -- combined with the Prime 
 
BAGHDAD 00000588  003 OF 003 
 
 
Minister's popularity there -- will likely forestall any 
serious movement toward southern region formation in the near 
future.  Regional aspirations in the south are not dead, 
however, and could resurface if the new provincial 
governments do not outperform the previous ones. 
 
------------ 
Southern Man 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C)  Prime Minister Maliki's support in the south and his 
success in maintaining it will greatly influence national 
Iraqi policy and our ability to manage key issues.  Although 
Maliki is often admired by the U.S. and Iraqis for converting 
Da'wa from a secret Shi'a underground society to a moderately 
religious broad-based nationalist party, the Prime Minister's 
core national strategy is nonetheless highly sectarian.  His 
is a strategy built on southern support, values and concerns. 
 Maliki's current micromanagement of post-election provincial 
coalition-building in the south (Reftel), including 
concessions of some executive positions to rivals in 
provinces where State of Law won, suggests a careful strategy 
to bring together the Sadrists, ex-Prime Minister Ja'afari's 
Reform party, Fadhilah, Iraqiyah, and ISCI, roughly in that 
order, to create a new Shi'a alliance in advance of the 
national elections.  ISCI appears unlikely to go along, 
however, given its cross-sectarian alliance at the national 
level with the Kurds and the Iraqi Islamic Party.  If Maliki 
is not able to keep ISCI within the fold and attempts to 
govern without it, this will have important repercussions at 
the national level.  It is likely that non-ISCI partners will 
be less amenable to compromise on core problems such as the 
Kurdish-Arab border disputes (on which ISCI plays a 
moderating role).  Maliki, a more accurate representative of 
southern sentiments than ISCI and other Shi'a parties 
regarding the Kurds, Iran, security, and governmental powers, 
will feel little pressure from his electoral base to make 
concessions. 
BUTENIS